A Lesson Not Learned in 26 Years: Comparing Chicago’s 1999 High-Rise Fire Safety Report and Maryland’s 2025 Workgroup Findings

February 3, 2026
Terin Hopkins
NFSA Manager of Public Fire Protection

 

High-rise fires have long posed a disproportionate threat to life safety, particularly in older residential towers built before modern fire codes took hold and required fire sprinklers in the late-1980’s. In 1999, Chicago sounded the alarm with a sobering commission report. More than a quarter century later, Maryland released its own findings on pre-1974 high-rise buildings. Despite the decades between them and the tragedies that have unfolded in the interim, the lessons remain the same, and the failures to act decisively are glaring.

Chicago’s 1999 Report: An Urgent Warning

The Chicago Commission Report on High-Rise Fire Safety: Problems & Solutions (1999) painted a stark picture:

  • Chicago’s high-rise fire death rate was 3.5 times the national average.
  • 91% of fatalities occurred in buildings without automatic sprinklers.
  • Most incidents were concentrated in older residential towers built before 1975.

The Commission’s conclusion was unequivocal: automatic sprinklers are the most effective means of preventing high-rise fire deaths, with the potential to cut fatalities by over 70%. It called for sweeping retrofit programs, supported by financial incentives, to make sprinklers and compartmentation achievable in aging buildings.

The report was not a suggestion, but a warning.

Maryland’s 2025 Report: A Governor-Appointed Workgroup

In 2024, following the tragic Arrive Apartments fire in Silver Spring, MD, which claimed the life of Ms. Melanie Diaz, in an older high-rise lacking full fire protection, Maryland lawmakers passed HB 823. This legislation directed the Governor to appoint a Workgroup on Fire Safety in Pre-1974 High-Rise Apartment Buildings (2025).

The Workgroup brought together a broad range of stakeholders, state fire officials, local fire service leaders, code experts, housing authorities, building owners, and resident representatives, to ensure the issue was studied from every angle. This makeup mirrored the structure of the 1999 Chicago High-Rise Commission, which likewise included fire officials, code experts, and community stakeholders, underscoring that both efforts recognized the importance of blending technical expertise with lived experience and policy insight.

The Workgroup’s 2025 final report tackled many of the same challenges Chicago identified a generation earlier:

  • Pre-1974 high-rises remain among the most dangerous residential structures due to their lack of sprinklers.
  • Retrofitting is technically feasible but poses cost, disruption, and logistical challenges.
  • Policymaking has to balance safety with economic feasibility and resident displacement concerns.

Unlike Chicago’s urgent call to action, the Maryland process was more deliberate and procedural, structured around subcommittees, staged recommendations, and a consensus-driven approach.

Tragedies in the Years Between

What makes the similarity between the two reports so troubling is the number of high-rise fire disasters that occurred in the 26 years separating them, each reinforcing the same lesson:

  • 2003 – Cook County Administration Building Fire (Chicago, IL): A fire on the 12th floor led to six fatalities, with victims trapped in a smoke-filled stairwell of an unsprinklered high-rise.
  • 2015 – Avalon at Edgewater Fire (Edgewater, NJ): A massive blaze destroyed a large apartment complex built without sprinklers in concealed spaces, displacing hundreds.
  • 2020 – Minneapolis Cedar High Apartments Fire (Minneapolis, MN): A blaze in a 25-story federally subsidized high-rise killed five residents; the building lacked sprinklers above the ground floor.
  • 2022 – Bronx Twin Parks Fire (Bronx, NY): A space heater ignited a deadly fire, killing 17 residents. Though the building had partial fire protection, inadequate compartmentation and smoke spread were catastrophic.
  • 2024 – Arrive Apartments Fire (Silver Spring, MD): A tragic fire in a pre-1974 high-rise resulted in multiple fatalities and injuries, directly influencing Maryland’s decision to form the HB 823 Workgroup.

Each of these incidents echoed the same themes raised in 1999 and again in 2025: sprinklers save lives, and the absence of retrofits in older high-rises leaves residents dangerously exposed.

Similarities Across Time

Despite the 26-year gap, the two reports align almost word-for-word on their findings:

  • The Problem: Older, unsprinklered residential high-rises remain disproportionately deadly.
  • The Solution: Automatic sprinklers are the cornerstone of life safety retrofits.
  • The Barrier: Costs and politics will remain the main obstacles to implementation.

Both documents highlight the same truth: the risk has been known for decades, yet action has lagged behind evidence.

The Lesson Not Learned

The comparison is sobering. In 1999, Chicago called for urgent retrofitting to save lives. By 2025, Maryland is still studying the same problem, even after high-rise fires have claimed hundreds of lives in the intervening years.

The lesson has not been learned. Reports continue to confirm the problem, but residents in unsprinklered high-rises remain vulnerable. The technology is proven. The need is clear. What remains missing is the political will to act decisively.

 Conclusion

Separated by 26 years and connected by recurring tragedies, Chicago’s 1999 Commission Report and Maryland’s 2025 Workgroup Report deliver the same conclusion: life safety in pre-code high-rises demands retrofits, not more studies.

Until sprinklers are installed, history will continue to repeat itself, at the cost of lives that could have been saved.

References

More about the Author:

Terin Hopkins has 40 years of experience in public safety, fire protection, and life safety policy. He currently serves as the Manager of Public Fire Protection for the National Fire Sprinkler Association (NFSA), where he leads technical support and advocacy efforts nationwide, working closely with fire departments, code and standard, and policymakers to improve fire protection infrastructure and compliance. He represents NFSA on many NFPA and UL technical committees, including NFPA 14 Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems.

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